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 Using Informational Labeling to
 Influence the Market for Quality in Food
 Products
 Julie A. Caswell and Eliza M. Mojduszka
 New technologies, scientific discoveries, infor-
 mation about linkages between diet and health,
 and the mass communication of this knowledge
 to consumers leads to increased demand for
 higher-quality foods, especially in higher-in-
 come countries. Food producers and retailers
 have responded to these changes in consumer
 demand by modifying and extending the variety
 of foods offered for sale. They are also engag-
 ing in more intensive marketing of particular
 attributes of food products, especially nutri-
 tional attributes; the marketing of safety at-
 tributes is also beginning to develop.
 Government policies and regulations on la-
 beling, in conjunction with input, process, and
 performance standards for food products, sig-
 nificantly influence how markets for food qual-
 ity function and develop. In the United States,
 the federal government is increasingly using in-
 formational labeling as a means of shaping (a)
 consumers' knowledge, purchasing patterns, and
 use practices, and (b) manufacturers' product of-
 ferings and marketing practices. Prominent ex-
 amples are mandatory nutrition labels on all food
 products, and safe handling labels for fresh meat
 and poultry. Our discussion here focuses on eco-
 nomic rationales for labeling policies and issues
 related to how the success or failure of these
 policies should be judged.
 Food Product Quality
 Product quality is usefully described, using
 Lancaster's approach, as a bundle of character-
 istics (attributes) that determine the product's
 performance. Major categories of food product
 quality attributes include food safety (e.g., lev-
 els of microbial pathogens, residues), nutri-
 tional, value (e.g., compositional integrity,
 taste), package, and process (e.g., animal wel-
 fare, environmental impact) attributes (Hooker
 and Caswell). Food quality attributes can be re-
 garded as having a demand and supply that in-
 teract to determine a market clearing price. The
 demand for food safety, for example, is deter-
mined by consumers' willingness to pay for ad-
 ditional safety, reflecting the value placed upon
 the benefits that they derive. As with other
 goods, it is assumed that consumers are willing
 to pay less for each additional unit of safety
 (Swinbank).
 In real-world situations, consumers choose
 foods within the context of a total diet in order
 to obtain greater expected utility from their
 food. Part of that utility derives from using
 food to maintain or improve health status (van
 Ravenswaay). Consumers with different risk
 pr ferences rationally choose different bundles
 of foods. However, if their perceptions of the
 quality attributes of foods are incorrect, con-
 sumers lose utility. For example, if their per-
 ceptions of the risks or hazards associated with
 foods are incorrect, consumers either take more
 risks than they would ideally like or pay more
 than they should for a higher-than-optimal level
 of food safety.
 Food producers will supply food quality if it
 is profitable for them or if they are required to
 do so. The contribution to profitability may
 stem from increased product differentiation,
 sales, and perhaps prices, or from avoidance of
 costly events such as a food-borne illness out-
 break with associated tort liability. In general,
 the marginal cost of additional units of food
 quality is likely to rise. Thus the market for
 food quality is characterized by a rising supply
 (marginal cost) curve and a falling demand
 (marginal benefit) curve (Kinsey; Henson and
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 Traill; Viscusi, Vernon, and Harrington). For
 example, the supply of safety is determined by
 the cost of producing incremental reductions in
 risk. The level of safety supplied by the market
 interaction of demand and supply reflects a
 level of risk which is acceptable, not necessar-
 ily zero. Under perfect market conditions, these
 curves intersect at a particular market clearing
 price providing the optimum level of food
 safety.
 The above scenario assumes that all market
 participants are fully informed about the nature
 of the product, that both buyers and sellers are
 price takers, and finally, that market prices
 fully reflect all the costs borne and benefits en-
 joyed by the society. In such a situation, the
 market price will transmit all necessary informa-
 tion, externalities will not exist, and government
 regulation is not required. In such a market, a va-
 riety of products with different associated quality
 (e.g., risk or nutrition levels) will be offered for
 sale at a variety of prices.
 We know, however, that the market for food
 quality is not perfect. The most significant im-
 perfections are that sellers are better informed
 about quality attributes than consumers, con-
 sumers may have misperceptions of the risks
 and hazards of consuming particular foods, and
 food quality and information about food quality
 may have public good characteristics. In this case,
 food quality (e.g., safety, nutritional quality) may
 be over- or undersupplied and government often
 intervenes in an attempt to correct imperfec-
 tions or mitigate their effects.
 Economic Models of Quality and Quality
 Signaling
 The greatest leverage in understanding how
 consumer markets for food quality operate is
 gained by using the distinction developed by
 Nelson (1970, 1974) and Darby and Karni be-
 tween search, experience, and credence goods
 and applying it to product attributes. For search
 attributes (or goods), consumers can determine
 a product's quality before they buy it by exam-
 ining or researching the product. For experi-
 ence attributes (or goods), consumers cannot
 determine a product's quality until they buy and
 use it. With credence attributes (or goods), con-
 sumers cannot determine the product's quality
 even after they buy and consume it. Because
 the information environments for these three
 types of attributes are so different, they pose
 very different issues for marketers and regula-
 tors. In addition, economic models that try to
 explain markets for qualit  can only effectively
 de l with one ype of attribute at a time.
 With search attributes or goods the main is-
 sue is product selection-the quality and diver-
 sity of g ods supplied. Spence (1975, 1976)
 sh we  n his early work that the single prod-
 uct producer's inc ntive to provide quality is
 related to the marginal willingness to pay for
 quality, for the marginal consumer in the case
 of a monopolist and for the average consumer
 in the case of a competitive producer. Because
 of th  way the market for search attributes op-
 e ates, they have been a relatively minor focus
 of government regulatory activities. In these
 mark ts, consumer information is relatively
 plentiful and easily attained so consumers can
 prot c  themselves, and their purchasing pat-
 erns provide direct incentives to producers to
provide the range of quality consumers are
 willing to pay for. Furthermore, in food product
 markets consumers make frequent purchases,
 and most search attributes (e.g., color) are what
 we term value attributes. They are not related to
 safety or nutrition so the consequence of con-
 sumers being temporarily misled is injuries to
 their pocketbooks but not to their health. Infor-
 mational labeling programs are less likely to be
 instituted for search attributes because the mar-
 ket functions relatively well with respect to
 them.
 For experience attributes, the most important is-
 sue is information and how consumers can learn
 about product quality. What incentives do firms
 have to supply quality? What prevents firms from
 taking advantage of imperfect information con-
 cerning product characteristics and selling poor-
 quality commodities, which cost less to produce
 than high-quality commodities? There is a moral
 hazard for the producer who sells an experience
 good without a warranty to one-time consumers
 because there is no penalty for selling inferior
 products. Models of markets for experience goods
 focus on how consumers can gain information on
quality to inform their purchases. Bagwell and
 Riordan, for example, considered an informed-
 consumers model where consumers enter the mar-
 ket sequentially. In this case, some consumers
 will know the quality and some will not. Effi-
 ciency may be improved if the knowledge of the
 informed consumers can be used by previously
uninformed consumers. Government may play a
 role in increasing the number of informed con-
 sumers by facilitating communication. An ex-
 ample would be inclusion of some form of con-
 sumer rating on product labels.
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 Information problems in markets for experi-
 ence goods may also be mitigated if consumers
 make repeated purchases of a product where
 their choices are based on prior experience with
 product quality. In economic models of this
 situation where reputation is important, a basic
 result is that equilibria require price to exceed
 marginal cost (Klein and Leffler, Allen, Shapiro
 1982, 1983). In repeated purchase situations,
 firms producing low-quality would lose money.
 For the reputation mechanism to work as an in-
 centive to firms to produce quality, consumers
 must have some degree of loyalty to higher-
 quality firms. The less loyalty among custom-
 ers, the higher the price has to be to prevent
 firms from cheating on quality.
 A key factor in determining whether markets
 for higher quality experience attributes operate
 effectively is the success of quality signaling
 (e.g., labeling, advertising, warranties) by pro-
 ducers to consumers. Several quality-signaling
 models explore how communication between
 sellers and consumers takes place, and as a re-
 sult how markets for experience goods perform.
 Akerlof's classic "lemons" model deals with
 the case where quality signaling between sell-
 ers, who have good information on product
 quality, and buyers, who have poor information,
 is totally ineffective. In this case, a market may
 not exist or only the lowest-quality product
 may be sold because of the adverse selection
 problem: if quality cannot be signaled, higher-
 quality products cannot get a price premium,
 and only lower-quality products will be offered
 for sale. On the other hand, Grossman's "un-
 folding model" predicts a smoothly operating
 market for experience goods when quality sig-
 naling is totally effective, costless, and truthful,
 and consumers can costlessly verify quality af-
 ter making their purchases. Price premiums for
 higher-quality products encourage firms to dis-
 close the exact quality of their products and a
 market exists for varying levels of quality.
 Improving information (i.e., moving from the
 Akerlof toward the Grossman world) through
 means such as advertising and labeling may
 solve or mitigate the quality-signaling problem.
 Whether consumers gain from being provided
 additional information depends on their relative
 transaction costs for becoming informed and
 how receptive they are to the messages. Using
 information imposes costs upon consumers.
 Those who attach little value to particular qual-
 ity attributes may choose to ignore information
 about them.
 Many food quality attributes are experience
 attributes, with the above mod ls giving insight
 into the operation of markets for them. For ex-
 ample, attributes such as taste and cooking
 properties can be read ly assess d by consum-
 ers during use. For these attributes, reputation
 models with quality signaling match how mar-
 kets operate. Government is unlikely to become
 heavily i volved in requiring informational la-
 beling of these attrib tes because with repeated
 purchases the market can satisfactorily self-
 correct.
 Food safety and nutritional characteristics are
 experience attributes in some respects. For ex-
 ample, if a c nsumer eats a particular food
 product and experiences a fo d-borne illness as
 a result, he or she has gained direct knowledge
 of the qual ty of that product. Several factors
 interfere, however, with food safety operating
 as an experience attribute. In many cases con-
 sumers may not be able to link accurately a
 particular product with an incidence of illness
 or even be aware of a possible link. The ina il-
 ity to pinpoint cau e and effect makes ex post
 evaluation of safety as a quality attribute diffi-
 cult. This is particularly true if longer periods
 of time intervene between consumption of a
 product and ill effects, as may be the case with
 some types of residue exposure. Similarly, the
 ill effects of a nutritionally poor diet occur over
 a period of time, making links between specific
 products and ill effects difficult for consumers
 to make.
 Informed consumer and reputational models
 of markets for experience attributes do not ap-
 ply well to food safety and nutritional at-
 tributes because of the consumer's problem in
 forming a quality judgment. Furthermore, for
 food safety, even if cause and effect relation-
 ships are relatively well known (e.g., eating a
 contaminated product will result in illness), the
 probability of a product being contaminated
 may not be well known. Thus it is uncertain
 how well one's former experience predicts fu-
 ture experience. For these reasons, it is useful
 to treat food safety and nutrition as credence
 attributes where the consumer has significant
 difficulty or cannot assess quality even after
 consumption.
 Economic models of quality hit a dead end
 when they come to discussion of credence at-
 tributes or goods because information is so im-
 perfect that these markets for quality simply do
 not function well. As noted above, the food
 safety and nutritional attributes of food are
 largely credence attributes. The key factor that
 makes them credence attributes is that it is not
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 practicable for individual consumers to assess
 the quality of the product. For example, an in-
 dividual consumer will not find it practicable to
 test the protein content or food-borne pathogen
 contamination level of his or her food. The con-
 sumer cannot measure the quality and also can-
 not learn it from his or her experience in con-
 suming the product. Informed consumer and
 reputational models of markets for quality do not
 apply here. Quality signaling may still be used but
 requires a reputable certification agent whom
 consumers can trust. It is in this context that gov-
 ernment often chooses to play a role in making
 it practicable for consumers to assess quality by
 requiring informational labeling.
 Transforming Experience and Credence
 Attributes into Search Attributes
 The presence of imperfect information, transac-
 tion costs in acquiring and using information,
 and externalities may make private markets for
 quality work inefficiently. In these cases, policy
 makers often look for correction tools. One of
 these tools can be direct government regulation
 of production processes or product characteris-
 tics, but such regulation is often criticized as
 economically irrational and costly. In response
 to this criticism, there has been some move-
 ment away from traditional forms of regulation
 toward interventions that are believed to be
 more compatible with seller and consumer in-
 centives. This has resulted in increased interest
 in techniques that ensure that consumers have
 sufficient information to protect themselves
 against unsafe products or unfair seller behav-
 ior. Economists have argued that if the govern-
 ment has the choice between banning a risky
 product or activity and providing information
 about the risks involved, it should choose infor-
 mation provision (Magat and Viscusi).
 Over the last decade, the U.S. government
 has placed a stronger emphasis on use of infor-
 mation provision programs as a means of influ-
 encing economic behavior. Providing additional
 or different information is attractive because it
 is a demand-led instrument, which may be ef-
 fective in giving consumers the means for mak-
 ing better decisions. If information problems can
 be solved directly through informational regula-
 tion, more stringent forms of regulation such as
 process or performance standards will not be re-
 quired. These latter approaches raise concerns be-
 cause they may restrict both consumer and pro-
 ducer choice and increase costs unnecessarily.
 Q ality signaling through product labeling and
 information disclosure requirements encourages
market incentives with relatively limited gov-
 ernment involvement, which is consistent with
 the regulatory philosophy of many policy mak-
 ers.
 Information remedies can take a variety of
forms, including the mandatory disclosure of
 i formation about the nature of a product and
 how it should be used, controls on voluntary
 claims in product promotion and the use of prod-
uct names, provision of public information and
 education, and subsidies for the provision of in-
 formation. Our discussion focuses on the first two
 remedies and their effect on quality and quality
 signaling at the interface between government re-
 quirements, manufacturer response, and con-
 sumer demand. Mandatory information disclo-
 sures often garner more attention than controls
 on voluntary claims, but both are important and
 they often work in tandem.
 For example, both forms of information regu-
lation are used by the Nutrition Labeling and
 Education Act of 1990 (NLEA), which went
 into effect in 1994. Nutrition labeling is manda-
 ory in the form of a standardized nutrition in-
 formation panel that presents data on the
 macro- and micronutrients found in a food. In
 addition, voluntary nutrient content claims
 (e.g., low sodium, high fiber) and health claims
 (e.g., claims linking increased consumption of a
 nutrient to lower incidence of a specific dis-
 ease) that are made outside the standardized in-
 formation panel are circumscribed by the law.
 These types of voluntarily provided informa-
 tion are regulated in order to prevent deception
 and to facilitate product evaluation by consum-
 ers. Under the NLEA, a voluntary low-fat claim
 means the same thing whether it appears on a
 bag of potato chips or a can of soup and, in
 fact, means that the product is low fat as de-
 fined by the regulation.
 Whether they mandate information or simply
 circumscribe voluntarily provided information,
 labeling regulations result in a basic transfor-
 mation of the information environment in mar-
 kets for quality attributes. They do so by trans-
 orming former experience or credence at-
 tributes into search attributes. (They may also
 improve the information environment for
 search attributes themselves.) Mandatory dis-
closures, for example, make it practicable for
 consumers to judge quality before purchasing a
 product by establishing a quality scale, requir-
 ing testing of quality, and mandating a report-
 ing format. Regulation of voluntary claims
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 serves similar purposes. The monitoring and
 enforcement activities of the government then
 attempt to ensure that the disclosures made are
 truthful and credible. For example, mandatory
 nutrition labeling makes characteristics such as
 fat content into search attributes that can be
 verified by reading the package label, while
 government oversight of claims increases their
 credibility. Thus labeling policies are intended
 to improve the quantity, and often the nature, of
 quality signaling in markets in order to improve
 the functioning of markets for quality at-
 tributes.
 Informational labeling for food safety at-
 tributes is currently in an early stage of devel-
 opment. As with nutrition, labeling of food
 safety attributes transforms credence into
 search attributes, although several special cir-
 cumstances make the information environment
 for food safety distinct from that of nutrition.
 One of these circumstances is that some food
 safety attributes such as food-borne pathogen
 levels can change considerably after the prod-
 uct leaves the processing plant, raising ques-
 tions about the point at which quality should be
 measured and labeled. Another is whether la-
 beling of safety levels is acceptable to policy
 makers, food companies, and consumers.
 Labeling to inform users about recommended
 food handling practices is yet a different case.
 For example, in the wake of the E. coli
 0157:H7 outbreak in the western United States
 in early 1993, the U.S. Department of Agricul-
 ture required all fresh meat and poultry prod-
 ucts to carry safe handling labels. These labels
 communicate safe handling practices including
 recommended storage, cooking temperature,
 and sanitation practices. They do not differenti-
 ate between beef products, for example, be-
 cause all products carry the same label, but may
 serve to differentiate between meat products in
 general and other food products that do not
 carry specific handling instructions. How this
 type of informational labeling functions in
 practice as a quality signal depends on whether
 consumers interpret it as an indicator of poor
 quality (e.g., the product poses a significant
 risk) or simply as a reminder to use good
 kitchen practices.
 Are Labeling Policies Effective?
 How do the changes labeling policies make in
 the information environment affect the market
 for quality in food products? And how do those
 changes in markets affect the ultimate targets
 of policy such as the health status of consum-
 ers? A significant problem with eval ating the
 effectiveness of informational labeling require-
ments is that the programs are of en comple-
 mentary to or coincidental with other forces in-
 fluencing markets for quality. Measuring a
 separate, distinct effect for labeling programs is
 difficult in these circumstances.
 For example, markets for nutritional quality
 were already changing significantly prior to
 implementation of the NLEA in 1994. Ippolito
 and Mathios found that in the late 1980s con-
 sumers were changing their purchasing patterns
 for ready-to-eat cereal as they became in-
 formed of the health benefits of cereal con-
 sumption and that advertising was an important
 source of information. Frazio and Allshouse
 used scanner data for the years 1989-93 to
 document strong growth in the availability of
 nutritionally improved versions of foods in
 thirty-seven food categories. Zarkin and Ander-
 son suggest that the direction and magnitude of
 d mand changes as a result of implementation
 of the NLEA depend on whether consumers ini-
 tially over- or underestimated the nutrient con-
 tent of foods. However, distinguishing the im-
 pact of nutrition labels from that of other fac-
 tors such as press coverage of links between
 nutrition and health or doctors' recommenda-
 tions is difficult. Research that attempts to do
 just that is underway.
 A second complicating factor in evaluating
 labeling policy is that it influences markets for
 quality in a variety of ways. Caswell and
 Padberg argued that the role of labeling should
 be viewed in a much broader sense that goes
 beyond its influence as a direct shopping aid
 for consumers. These roles include influencing
 product design, advertising, consumer confi-
dence in food quality, and consumer education
 on diet and health.
 Finally, relationships between levels of con-
 sumer information and behavior are complex.
 Fo  example, extensive work by Viscusi and
 Magat (1987, 1992) examined how people alter
 their behavior in response to hazard warnings
 and risk labeling in a variety of settings. Their
 findings provide specific directives for when
 different types of information provision instru-
 ments are effective and when they are not, as
 well as which kinds of instruments will have
 the greatest impact. The implications of this
 and other empirical and theoretical research on
 policies that provide information is that labels
 can change consumers' levels of understanding
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 about quality attributes and alter their con-
 sumption behavior. However, variation across
 consumers in their responses to the information
 can be expected.
 We think informational labeling requirements
 are likely to have a significant impact on de-
 mand patterns and the dynamics of markets for
 food quality. As information about product
 quality and use characteristics improves, manu-
 facturers will compete for market shares from
 sales to attribute-conscious, label-using con-
 sumers. Products and industries with less desir-
 able quality profiles may reformulate or rede-
 sign processes to avoid unfavorable compari-
 sons with other products. As labeling solutions
 to information problems in markets for food
 product quality are relied upon more heavily, it
 is important to make the ex post effort to evalu-
 ate what impact this informational labeling is
 having.
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